Checking the Integrity of CCTV Footage in Real Time at Nuclear Facilities by Bobok, I. et al.
68 ISSN 2073-6231. Ядерна та радіаційна безпека 2(70).2016
M
odern digital technologies, which are applied 
in the development of automated control systems 
of technological processes, computer networks, 
security systems, etc., play an important 
role in the operation of nuclear power plants. 
These technologies transmit information from the station level 
to the power grid management level and back, implement 
the operational management of the current regime by operators, 
track changes in the state of an object in real time, etc. It should 
be noted that the use of the above-mentioned technologies, many 
of which are vulnerable to cyber attacks, at installations with 
limited access requires special attention to the issue of integrated 
security [1, 2].
This paper considers one element of the integrated security 
system — CCTV system.
Early Basic Research Efforts and Publications. Today, 
CCTV has become an essential part of the integrated security 
system at limited access facilities (banks, administrative 
institutions, scientific laboratories, nuclear power plants), 
because the modern equipment allows not only monitoring 
and control of various components of the object in real time 
and video recording, but also program response from the entire 
security system upon alarm signals. In view of this, camera-
generated video sequence may be the subject of falsification by 
the attackers, whose aim is the unauthorized entry to a secure 
object.
The falsifications of the video sequences from surveillance 
cameras can occur in various ways [3]. First of all, it depends 
on where the camera (indoor/outdoor) is placed and where its 
stationary position is. So, if the location of a stationary camera 
is indoors, access to which is limited, an attacker can involve 
hijacking video streams and seamlessly replace them with static 
image which repeats over and over again; it is called “camera 
loop” [4].
The Aim of Research is to develop a method for detection 
of the “camera loop” hijacking in video sequences from 
surveillance cameras in real time.
Description of Research. In view of the fact that the use 
of the “camera loop” hijacking is limited in time (often small) 
interval t, it is extremely difficult to visually notice the result 
because the dynamics of scene changes in the premises 
where movement is very small. However, in a real room 
this dynamics should take place, which is associated with 
(albeit minor) heat and mass transfer, brightness, humidity, 
etc., which leads to movement of air masses. Modern video 
cameras are very sensitive to the most minor changes of scene, 
invisible to the human eye. These changes can be registered 
as perturbation of brightness matrix elements of consecutive 
frames of video sequences.
To confirm the hypothesis, numerical experiments were 
conducted. During the experiments, various cameras were 
installed in the inaccessible premises and made 24th-shooting 
of all scenes. Moreover, the presence of natural and artificial 
light sources in the room changed with different (stationary) 
position of the camera geometrically and toward the light 
source. The arbitrary video sequence is a sequence of frames, 
each of which can be seen as a stationary digital image. 
The formal representation of such images is one, three, four 
two-dimensional matrices depending on color or monochrome 
image, storage schema, etc. [3]. The changes of scene in terms 
of developments can be seen as changes of element values 
of matrices, corresponding to successive frames.
During the experiment, the first 100 frames from each 
analyzed video sequence were thrown out, and then sequence 
of 200 frames was processed. For each pair of consecutive 
frames, n×m-matrices of which are denoted as F and F  with 
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Перевірка цілісності записів камер відеоспостере-
ження в режимі реального часу на об’єктах атомної 
енергетики
За останні роки відеоспостереження стало невід’ємною складовою 
частиною комплексної системи безпеки атомних електростанцій. Тому 
надзвичайно важливими є цілісність і автентичність відеоінформації, 
переданої камерою відеоспостереження, а також можливість встанов-
лення порушень згаданих категорій інформації в режимі реального часу.
У роботі пропонується метод виявлення одного з порушень ціліс-
ності відеопослідовності — заставки. Принцип, покладений в осно-
ву методу (виявлення збурень матриці поточного кадру оригінальної 
відео послідовності під час переходу до подальшого кадру), дає змогу 
забезпечити незалежність ефективності методу від специфіки отри-
мання та характеристик аналізованої відеопослідовності. Висока ефек-
тивність методу підтверджена результатами обчислювального експе-
рименту, в умовах якого помилки першого і другого роду не виявлено. 
Практична цінність методу полягає в можливості організації його ро-
боти в режимі реального часу, оскільки він є поліноміальним ступеня 1, 
а також у простоті й  мультіплатформенності реалізації.
К л ю ч о в і  с л о в а: комплексна система безпеки, відеоспостере-
ження, відеопослідовність, порушення цілісності, заставка.
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elements ,ij ijf f , 1, , 1,i n j m= = , respectively, we determine 
the n×m-matrix of absolute difference ( )abs= −R F F  with 
elements
 ,ij ij ijr f f= − 1, , 1,i n j m= = .
We founded that for each pair of consecutive frames from 
each of the original video sequences, there are elements 
of the matrix R different from 0, i.e. for each pair of consecutive 
frames:
 ≠F F .
Moreover, such elements constitute from 8 to 21 % of the total. 
Detailed experimental results for some of the examined video 
sequences are presented in Table 1. The results are given 
for the red color component of the matrix representation 
of the frame (RGB system); those for the other two color 
components are comparable to the presented results.
On average, for each pair of consecutive frames, brightness 
of nine percent pixels is changed by more than one scale. 
A typical pattern is shown in Fig. 1.
The chart corresponds to the original video sequence that 
fully confirms the proposed hypothesis. For the “camera 
loop”, there are no changes from frame to frame, which would 
allow distinguishing it from the original video and identifying 
unauthorized actions of the attacker.
Taking into account the potential large size of analyzed 
frames and the need for fundamental possibility of analyzing 
in real-time, it is possible to analyze not entire frame, but only 
part of it. To do this, we must set the allowable size of the part 
of the frame, the analysis of which would be informative in terms 
of detecting “camera loop” hijacking, i.e. the portion sizes, 
which will obligatory contain disturbed pixels (for the frame 
sequence number of such pixels may be less than 5 % (Table 1) 
and their arrangement within a frame in the general case is 
unknown).
As a result of computing experiment, it was determined 
that for video sequence corresponding to scene with natural 
light source it is sufficient to consider the frame’s sub-domains 
of size 100 × 100 pixels (such sub-domains necessarily contain 
(single) disturbed pixels) (Fig. 2, b), and without natural light 
source — 32 × 32 pixels (Fig. 2, a).
To reduce the analysis time of the video sequence (to allow 
the execution in real time) we propose to conduct a comparison 
of pairs of the non-consecutive frames, but frames taken with 
certain time period T. It is necessary that
 T < t.  (1)
Table 1. Results of the computational experiment for 
original video sequences made by stationary camera
VS
Arithmetical mean 
of the number 
of non-zero 
elements of matrix R 
by frames of video 
sequence, %
Arithmetical 
mean for maximal 
value of elements 
of matrix R 
by frames of video 
sequence 
Arithmetical mean 
of the number 
of non-zero 
elements of matrix R 
greater than one, 
%
V1 81 31 10
V2 82 33 11
V3 81 27 10
V4 84 27 9
V5 90 33 5
V6 90 24 5
V7 90 25 4
V8 89 32 5
V9 87 36 8
V10 83 37 10
Fig. 1. The typical form of histogram of the values of the elements of matrix R for two consecutive frames of the original video sequence:
a — without natural light source; b — with natural light source
а b
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Using the non-consecutive frames will reduce analysis time 
due to:
 the reduction in the number of analyzed pairs of frames;
 the fact that differences in non-consecutive frames of the original 
video sequences will be in more pixels  than in consecutive frames;  it 
will also reduce the sizes of the analyzed subdomains of frames.
In view of the presented results, algorithm of detecting 
the presence of the “camera loop” in the video sequence from 
surveillance camera in real time is as follows.
Let’s V is analyzed video sequence, where V (1), V (2), …, V (k) 
are frames; r is frame rate; T is a period between two analyzed 
frames and is measured in seconds.
Step 1 (Initialization). p = p0 (p0 — number of first analyzed 
frame from V ).
Step 2. For V (p) and V (p+rT ) we extract the analyzed 
subdomains of size l × l: F(l) and 
( )l
F  in an arbitrary color 
component (RGB system) (or brightness matrix (YUV [5])).
Step 3. Forming the l × l-matrix abs
( )( ) ll 
= − R F F .
Step 4. For matrix R elements:
If rij = 0 for , 1,i j l∀ = ,
then “Camera Loop” detected, EXIT;
else
if 2p rT k+ ≤
then p = p + rT, go to Step 2
else EXIT.
Remark. For processing the pair of frames of the video 
sequence, the number of operations does not depend on the size 
of the frame’s matrix, the total number of frames, i.e. it is 
a constant. In view of this, the maximum computational 
complexity of the algorithm in the processing of frames V(1), 
V(2), …, V(k) (in the case of processing two successive frames, i.e. 
rT  = 1) would be defined as
 ( )O k ,   (2)
which makes it possible to use it in real time.
Discussion. Underlying the principle of the proposed method 
based on identifying the perturbation of matrix of the frame 
of the original video sequence in the transition to the next 
frame, ensures the independence of the efficiency of the method 
on the specifics of obtaining and characteristics of the analyzed 
video sequence.
To test the effectiveness of the developed method 
and algorithmic implementations for different values 
of the parameters numerical experiments were conducted 
in MATLAB 7.4.0.287 (License number: 21808. Platform: 
All. License option: Group Term: Perpetual. Use: Classroom) 
on a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 processor. There were 300 original 
video sequences (MPEG-4 codec, MOV container), each 
of which was from 90 to 900 seconds recorded by multiple 
cameras, namely Olympus SP-820 — 1/2,3” CMOS, 14MP; 
Nikon COOLPIX P100 — 1/2,3” CMOS, 10,3MP; Canon 
PowerShot A520 — 1/2,5” CCD, 4MP. It should also be 
pointed out that characteristics of cameras used in experiments 
similar to cameras used in production facilities including at 
nuclear facilities, for example, Rolls-Royce CDS 5000 [6], or 
ECA Group DTR 65 HRC [7]. Shooting was made at different 
times of the day, in presence/absence of natural/artificial light 
sources (Table 2 — here, the last column shows the designation 
of the video sequence belonging to this category, which is used 
below); herewith frames obtained by cameras are represented 
as images with different resolution (from 320×240 to 1920×1080), 
contrast, brightness, with/without fine details.
The proposed method is actually a binary classifier 
therefore the effectiveness of the algorithmic implementation 
of the method was evaluated using the Type I (“camera loop” 
is not detected) and Type II (“camera loop” is false detected) 
errors.
Type I and Type II errors were defined by a standard way [8], 
namely, the frequency of occurrence of the relevant events 
in the experiments, taking into account that with an increase 
in number of trials (in our case — the number of analyzed 
video sequences) the frequency of the event loses its random 
nature, tends to stabilize, and approach to some average 
Fig. 2. The typical form of histogram of the values of the elements of matrix R for subdomains of two consecutive frames of the original video sequence:
a — without natural light source size of subdomain is 32×32 pixels; b — with natural light source (size of subdomain is 100×100 pixels)
а b
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constant value (in accordance with Bernoulli’s theorem), which 
is the probability of the event. It is only necessary to note that 
this “approach” has a feature: with increasing number of trials n 
the frequency of event un converges to its probability p, i.e. for 
any ε > 0 with increasing n the probability of the following 
inequality
 
nu p− < ε  
tends to 1 [9]. Thus, with increasing number of trials n 
the frequency approaches to the probability without absolute 
certainty, but with the probability that with large number 
of trials can be considered as the practical certainty [9]; that 
was used for estimating of Type I and Type II errors.
Table 2. The distribution of 300 original video sequences used 
during the numerical experiment into different categories
Number of video sequences that 
made in the presence of natu-
ral light (without artificial light 
source)
Time 600 — 1200 25 V11
Time 1200 — 1700 25 V12
Time 1700 — 2400 25 V13
Number of video sequences 
that made in the presence 
of natural light (with artificial 
light source)
Time 600 — 1200 25 V21
Time 1200 — 1700 25 V22
Time 1700 — 2400 25 V23
Number of video sequences 
that made without natural light 
source (with artificial light 
source)
150
V31
The theoretical possibility of Type I errors can be only 
in one case — if the condition (1) is false; in any other case 
Type I errors are impossible. If the preliminary assessment 
of the time t of the attacker’s possible actions is not available, 
the best in order to avoid a possible “camera loop” hijacking 
skip during the video sequence analysis is to consider the pairs 
of consecutive frames, i.e. 
1
T
r
=  guarantees the absence 
of errors of Type I errors.
Type II errors [8] are fundamentally possible in the case 
where the sizes l × l of the analyzed subdomain of the frame 
would be insufficient to contain guaranteed perturbed (relative 
to the previous frame pixels) of the subsequent analyzed frame 
of the original video sequence. Results of computational 
experiment where 1T
r
= , are given in Table 3; the conclusion 
of the “camera loop” in video sequences was made as soon 
as was found at least one pair of frames for which l×l-matrix 
R = 0.
The presented results in practice confirm the above 
theoretical conclusion that the effectiveness of this method does 
not depend on the specific conditions in which the received 
video sequence, the specifics of frames (resolution, contrast, 
brightness, presence/absence and size of the background 
areas, presence/absence of fine details) — the results for all 
categories are congruent. In the algorithmic implementation 
of the method, it makes sense to consider l×l-subdomains for 
l ≥ 100.
Table 3. Type II errors in the analysis of video 
sequences using the developed method, %
         l
VS
8 16 32 100 120
V11 100 87 14 2 0
V12 97 87 17 0 0
V13 98 86 12 0 0
V21 100 84 15 0 0
V22 99 72 21 2 0
V23 99 88 11 1 0
V31 98 90 2 0 0
Conclusions. Securing objects with limited access, which are 
the modern nuclear power plants, remained unresolved task until 
now and requiring solutions for the integrated systems approach. 
Certainly, the special attention is given to the important 
issues relating to nuclear security and preventing interference 
from the outside, cooling the reactor and prevent the escape 
of radioactive substances outside the pressurized zone [10], while 
the cause of such worst-case situations may be the unauthorized 
actions of attackers who had access to the limited access 
premises and networks. Due to this, the integrity and authenticity 
of the video transmitted by the CCTV cameras are extremely 
important, as well as the possibility of establishing violations 
of these categories of information in real time.
In this article the authors presented a new method for 
detection of the “camera loop” hijacking in video sequences 
from surveillance cameras in real time. The high efficiency 
of the developed method is confirmed by the results 
of computational experiments — during the analysis of video 
sequences by comparing the l × l-subdomains of the pairs 
of consecutive frames with l > 100, Type I and Type II errors 
were not found.
The practical value of the proposed method is as follows:
•  the possibility of organizing its work in real time, 
as in accordance with (2) it is a polynomial of degree 1, even 
when processing successive frames of a video sequence;
•  simplicity and multiplatform implementation.
The signal from the CCTV cameras considered by 
the way of attacks on the integrity is one of the most easily 
implemented variations of this violation. This method is not 
used by the attackers if camera’s installation is not stationary, 
or the camera is outside the premise with limited access. In this 
case, it will be used “insert”-method [11], when the original 
signal V  from the camera at the time t will be replaced by another 
video signal tV , and then the broadcast of original signal 
will be resumed. There are several options for generating tV , 
but the most interesting, difficult to recognize and most likely 
(given to the interest in challenging the process of establishing 
the real signal substitution) is a choice when tV  video sequence 
showing the scene similar to  V  and made by the same camera for 
which substitution is performed. Here, the problem of detecting 
the substitution is reduced to determine of “place of insert”, 
because all the technical parameters of the video sequence tV  
are similar to the parameters of the original video V. The results 
of this task solution in real-time are currently being prepared 
for publication by the authors.
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